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1
and not a default in the action itself.V8
Furthermore, since the
three methods of appearance specified in CPLR 320(a) do not
include the service of an answer to a motion,8 9 it was held that
defendant could not be considered in default until the return date
of the motion. Thus, this decision interprets the reference to CPLR
320(a) in CPLR 3213 as merely setting forth the time allowable
for the return of motion papers, rather than as giving an exact
date upon which a defendant will automatically be in default.
The opinion of the court in the principal case is consistent
with the purpose and spirit of the legislation. That purpose is
"to destroy the delay incident upon waiting for an answer, and
then moving for summary judgment."'170 The Judicial Conference
designed the amendment "to allow plaintiff time to study the, answering papers. .... "171 This more simple, direct, time and expense saving procedure can not be considered so desirable as to
allow a defendant to be deprived of his day in court. Moreover,
there is no undue delay in the disposition of meritorious claims inherent in a rule which prevents a default judgment in the brief
span between the date set for service of answering papers and the
return date.

CPLR 3216: Court can dismiss for want of prosecution on basis
of "general delay."
The calm in the plaintiffs' bar created by the interpretation
that Salama v. Cohen 172 destroyed general delay as an independent
basis for a CPLR 3216 motion, was, viewed retrospectively, the quiet
before a storm. Ignoring those who considered Salama the last
word on the interpretation of the 1964 Volker Amendment, the
Court of Appeals, in Commercial Credit Corp. v.Lafayette LincolnMercury, Inc.'7 3 restricted the applicability of the forty-five day
demand requirement solely to motions based on failure to file a
note of issue. Simultaneously, the Court recognized the existence
of unreasonable "general delay" as a separate basis for dismissal
for want of prosecution.
With this recognition of general delay, the controversy surrounding the extensiveness of the 1964 amendment has come full
168 Id. at 80, 266 N.Y.S2d at 899.

169 Supra note 163, at 30. Any extension (up to 10 days) over the minimum
period provided by CPLR 320 (a), granted by the plaintiff, entitles him
to a copy of the answering papers that many days before the return date
of the motion.
170 Knudson v. Flynn-Hill, Knudson Elevator Corp., supra note 166, at
81, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 900.

1717B McKixNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary 817 (1963).
172 16 N.Y2d 1058, 213 N.E2d 461, 266 N.Y.S2d 131 (1965); see 40
ST. JoHN's L. Rzv. 303, 340 (1966).
73 17 N.Y2d 367, 212 N.E2d 271, 272 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1966).
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circle. The amendment was the proximate result of the 'first department's decision in Sortino v. Fischer,'7 4 which declared war
on lethargic plaintiffs by decimating numerous excuses for delay
traditionally found sufficient. 7 5 Noting that it would henceforth be
difficult to excuse any avoidable delay, the court in Sortino flexibly
defined proscribed general delay as "any unreasonable delay, depending upon the nature of the case, the degree of merit, and the
particular difficulties which the litigating plaintiff faced. . ..
Based on the premise that the merit of a claim is inversely
proportional to the delay in litigating it, the Sortino court held
that only a convincing affidavit of merits would overcome a motion
by a defendant who had not himself affirmatively added to the
delay.' 7 The court thus aligned itself with the legislative intent
to allow the court full discretion in deciding CPLR 3216 motions. 78
The reaction of the plaintiffs' bar to Sortino was swift. Three
months after the decision, the 1964 amendment was signed into
law. This provided that a motion to dismiss for failure to serve
and file a note of issue could not be made until at least six months
after joinder of issue. Thereafter, defendant had to serve a written
demand upon the plaintiff, requiring a note of issue to be filed.
The plaintiff then had forty-five days in which to comply, at the
risk of having his case dismissed.
The amendment was "intended to enable plaintiff to file his
note of issue within 45 days and thereby avoid 3216 entirely." ' 7 9 However, the language of the amendment created problems. The courts had to decide whether "such a motion" referred
to all 3216 motions or whether it was restricted to a motion to
dismiss for failure to file a note of issue.
17420 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (lst Dep't 1963).
For an
excellent analysis of the Sortino case, see 7B McKnrNav's CPLR 3216,
supp. commentary 169-73 (1964).
175 The court scrutinized law office failures, settlement negotiations, pretrial activity, statute of limitations, disabling circumstances and parallel
litigation.
7,6
Sortino v. Fischer, 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 28, 245 N.Y.S2d 186, 191
(1st Dep't 1963).
3,77Id. at 28, 31-32, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 190, 194-95.
"Such an affidavit must
contain evidentiary facts establishing that plaintiff has a viable cause of
action . . . as good as the kind of affidavit which could defeat a motion
for summary judgment?' Id. at 32, 245 N.Y.S2d at 194-95.
178 See id.at 26, 32-33, 245 N.Y.S2d at 190, 195.
179 7B MCK NNE'S CPLR, supp. commentary 160 (1965).
Legislative
history shows that the original CPLR 3216 was intended to be broader than
its predecessor CPA § 181, wherein specific bases for dismissal were
enumerated, and that nothing was to inhibit the court in its dealings "with
the multifarious situations which might amount to want of prosecution and
the numerous factors that might excuse a delay." FIRST RFP. 102

(1957).
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Subsequently, the first department consistently regarded the
amendment as merely creating a new basis for a CPLR 3216 dismissal. 80 For the first department, the statutory prerequisites of
a written demand and forty-five day waiting period applied only
to the motion to dismiss for failure to file a note of issue, leaving
dismissal for general delay to the court's discretion.
The second department, however, refused to agree with the
first department's interpretation of the words "such a motion," and
read the amendment as being relevant to all 3216 motions.","

Those who looked to the Court of Appeals to resolve the lower
courts' divergent views were disappointed when, in Fischer v. Pan
Am. Airways, Inc.,'8 it merely ruled that a motion based on the
plaintiff's failure to file a note of issue could not be granted before
the 1964 amendment's procedural requisites had been complied with.
Since Fischer did not decide whether a motion based on general
delay survived the amendment, the first department was able to
distinguish it, and thus retain its interpretation of CPLR 3216.1s1
The New York State Association of Trial Lawyers'. 84 was
highly critical of the first department's decisions, and it is possible
that their- arguments contributed to the Court of Appeals' reversal
of the first department's dismissal in Salanm. It was believed that
the Court contributed substantially to the Association's battle for
a singular reading of CPLR 3216 by holding that:
a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3216 cannot be granted prior to the
filing of a note of issue unless defendant has first served a written
demand on the plaintiff to serve and file the note of issue within the
forty-five days in accordance with the terms of the statute. 8 5
180Weeks v. Jankowitz, 23 App. Div. 2d 549, 256 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st
Dep't 1965); Rutigliano v. Richter, 23 App. Div. 2d 489, 255 N.Y.S.2d
341 (lst Dep't 1965) ; Brown v. Weissberg, 22 App. Div. 2d 282, 254 N.Y.S.2d
628 (1st Dep't 1964) (dictum); Malinos v. Coliseum Constr. Corp.,
22 App. Div. 2d 163, 254 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1st Dep't 1964).

181 McLoughlin v. Weiss, 23 App. Div. 2d 881, 259 N.Y.S.2d 941 (2d
Dep't 1965); Dooley v. Gray, 22 App. Div. 2d 791, 253 N.Y.S.2d 808
(2d Dep't 1964).
182 16 N.Y.2d 725, 209 N.E.2d 725, 262 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1965).
183 Roberts v. New York Post Corp., 24 App. Div. 2d 714, 263 N.Y.S.2d
338 (1st Dep't 1965). See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lafayette LincolnMercury, 24 App. Div. 2d 851, 264 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1st Dep't 1965), aff'd,
17 N.Y2d 367, 212 N.E.2d 271, 272 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1966), decided before the
Sala=a ruling, which based a dismissal on the Roberts decision.
184The New York State Association of Trial Lawyers led the lobbr
for the 1964 amendment and has filed amicus curiae briefs in all the New
York Court of Appeals decisions. See the criticism of Sortino written by
its president, Mr. Herman Glaser, in 151 N.Y.L.J., February 6, 1964, p. 4,
col. 1.
185 Salama v. Cohen, 16 N.Y.2d 1058, 1060, 213 N.E.2d 461, 462, 266
N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (1965).
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Subsequently, in spite of the generality of the Salauz ruling,
the first department unexpectedly acquiesced in the interpretation
of the amendment's proponents. In Shabot v. Quincy Mut. Fire
Ins. Co.,15s the court, citing Salama, stated that "a compliance with
the provisions of the forty-five day rule of CPLR 3216 by placing
the case on the calendar in the requisite time would seem to preclude the dismissal of the action for failure to serve and file a note
of issue or for lack of prosecution." 187 Thus, although still convinced of the existence of two distinct CPLR 3216 motions, the
first department nevertheless held that Salama dictated that all such
motions were governed by the procedural restrictions of the 1964
amendment.
Then, altering what was considered to be settled law, the
Court of Appeals, in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lafayette LincolnMercury, Inc.,18 recognized the existence of a dismissal for general
delay and held that such a dismissal could be had even though
plaintiff had filed a note of issue. The Court took into account the
insight into the legislative intent afforded it by the vetoed 1965
amendment. This amendment would have explicitly applied the
written demand and forty-five day grace period to the original
statute as well as to the 1964 amendment. If, implied the Court,
the legislature originally intended the forty-five day demand to
apply to the first as well as to the second paragraphs of the effective statute, the subsequent activity to ratify the 1965 amendment
would have been useless and contradictory. Additionally, the veto
on the advice of the entire appellate division, the state's bar associations, and the Judicial Conference confirmed for the Court the
existence, after the 1964 amendment, of a motion ruled solely by
"the ancient power of the courts"--judicial discretion-and not
by a legislative formula. The history of the defeated amendment
indicated that the lower courts could grant a dismissal for want
of prosecution if, in their opinion, the plaintiff's delay was unreasonable and unjustified. But the Court added that this could occur
only after plaintiff had filed a note of issue. However, the Court
intimated that once the plaintiff had filed a note of issue, it would
be a meaningless formality to require the defendant to serve a
forty-five day demand. 8 9 The Court restricted Salana to situations
wherein the plaintiff did not file a note of issue.
One commentator sees Commercial Credit as creating a "logical
absurdity" when allowed to exist simultaneously with Salama. He
stated that "the plaintiff who persists in his delay .. .is protected
by Salaza, secure in the knowledge that by complying with any
18624 App. Div. 2d 972, 266 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep't 1965).

18Id. at 973, 266 N.Y.S2d at 504. (Emphasis added.)
1ss 17 N.Y.2d 367, 212 N.E.2d 271, 272 N.Y.S2d 218 (1966).
189 Id. at 372-73, 212 N.E.2d at 271, 272 N.Y.S2d at 218.
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forty-five day demand he can forestall a motion to dismiss." 20
But such security is misleading. A defendant can demand that a
note of issue be filed within forty-five days. Afterwards, he can
seek a dismissal for the "general delay". which occurred prior to
the filing of the note of issue. Thus, by failing to timely file, a
plaintiff will play right into the hands of a defendant seeking a dismissal for "general delay." The net effect of this is that defendants are encouraged not to expedite the proceedings, but rather to
allow the plaintiff enough rope to hang himself.
Collateral Estoppel: Defensive assertion of collateral estoppel
allowed in suit involving joint tort-feasors.
Ten years ago, the Court of Appeals abolished the requirement of mutuality for the defensive assertion of collateral estoppel
in Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.191 Until recently, it did not appear
that the lower courts had applied the Israel decision to cases involving joint tort-feasors. Although the facts given by the court
are incomplete, it seems that the appellate division, fourth department, in Hires v. New York Central R.R.1 92 has applied Israel
to such a situation.
There, plaintiff's intestate was found to have been contributorily negligent in a prior suit against the State of New York
and, therefore, plaintiff was denied recovery. Plaintiff then sued
the New York Central on a cause of action arising out of the
same accident. The court held that "the prior judgment is a
complete defense and precludes the prosecution of the cause
herein." 193
This is a departure from the previous attitude of the lower
courts in applying the Israel doctrine. For example, in the July,
1966 issue of The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, a third
department decision, Cumrinitigs v. Dresher, was examined. The
court took great pains to show that there was no identity of
issues so that the holding of Israel could be avoided. 94
Davis, Jr., Volker Law, 156 N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
N.Y2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956). Collateral estoppel
insures that issues once litigated will be conclusive in a subsequent suit involving different causes of action or parties. Prior to the Israel case,
the courts imposed a requirement of mutuality in order to assert the estoppel.
Since non-parties and non-privies are not bound by a judgment, normally
they cannot attempt to benefit therefrom. Thus the party seeking to assert
collateral estoppel must have been either party or privy to the previous
action. The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. Joutds L. REv.
121, 148 (1966).
19223 App. Div. 2d 1075, 265 N.Y.S.2d 895 (4th Dep't 1965).
19s Hires v. New York Cent. M.R., 23 App. Div. 2d 1075, 265 N.Y.S.2d
895, 896 (4th Dep't 1965).
19424 App. Div. 2d 912, 264 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d Dep't 1965), as discussed
in The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S, L. REv.
190
1911

